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4. Conclusion .
If there is a lesson to be learned from MacKay, it is that the
Supreme Court of Canada remains unable to come to grips with
questions of rights . Assuming that, as a matter of principle, an
apparent abrogation of rights can be justified if it is necessary, it is
incumbent upon the court to explain what that necessity is . The
court's failure to do so undermines the persuasiveness of the decision .
Moreover, it suggests that apparently sophisticated doctrine, such as
was offered by McIntyre J., is worth little in the absence of an
adequate analysis of the facts .
The weakness in the court's approach is not primarily a function
of the non-entrenched status of the Bill of Rights . It is a function of
our legal culture, which traditionally has defined a role for the judici
ary subordinate to that of the legislature.' $ This role inhibits the court
from asking the questions which must be asked when issues of rights
are considered . Oldhabits die hard, and there is little reason to expect
that the court will change its orientation dramatically if a Charter of
Rights is entrenched .
sa Gold, op . cit., footnote 24, at pp . 348-358 .
*Marc Gold of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto .
MARC GOLD
SECURITY INTERESTS IN SECURED OBLIGATIONS.-Complex priority
questions arise in connection with secured transactions with secured
obligations . Additional complications come to the surface where the
statute which governs the secured transaction with the obligation does
not apply to the interest securing it . This is typical wherethe collateral
under the secured transaction is an obligation secured by a real estate
mortgage . All this came up recently in Re Urman, t a decision given
by Steele J. of the Ontario Supreme Court.
The facts of the case were as follows: before his bankruptcy,
Urman carried on business as a real estate mortgage broker . The
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce ("the bank") which acted as
his banker acquired from him a general assignment of accounts with
respect to which a financing statement was properly registered under
(1982), 128 D.L.R . 33, (1981), 38 C .B .R . (N .S .) 261 (Ont . S .C . in Bkcy) . All
internal cites in this comment are from the C.B.R ., being the only report of the case, at
the time the comment was submitted for publication .
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the Ontario Personal Property Security Act. Z Apparently, the general
assignment related to all existing and future accounts held by Urman .
The financing statement was outstanding at the time of Urman's
bankruptcy.
At all material times, the bank was aware that Urman, in the
ordinary course of his business, was acquiring real estate mortgages
primarily for resale to his clientele . The bank provided a revolving
line of credit for this purpose . Repayment to the bank was anticipated
to be from Urman's sale of mortgages, payment on the mortgages
themselves, and from profits on the sale of mortgages . The general
assignment provided that all monies collected or received by Urman
were to be received by him as trustee for the bank and ought to be paid
over to the bank,
Urman's trustee in bankruptcy ("the trustee") applied to the
court for advice and direction' to determine the respective interests
and priorities with respect to certain mortgages held or formerly held
by Urman . Four test cases were the subject of the decision . The first,
third and fourth cases were contests with respect to mortgages that had
been assigned by Urman to specific lenders to secure his indebtedness
to each of them.` The subject-matter of the second case was a mort-
gage held by Urman for the benefit of certain "trust claimants", that
is, various persons fromm whom he received money after he had
advanced his own money to the mortgagor-borrowers
Some of the competing assignees, but not the bank, registered
their respective interests in the appropriate registry or land titles
office . None of the competing assignees or "trust claimants" reg-
istered a financing statement under the PPSA.
Steele J . held that the PPSA applied to all of Urman's assign-
ments. Since the bank registered a financing statement in connection
with the general assignment, it held a perfected security interest in all
' Presently R.S.O ., 1980, c . 375, as am ., hereinafter cited as PPSA .
s Pursuant to s .lb of the Bankruptcy Act, R.S .C ., 1970, c . B-3, as am .
In the third case the contest was between the bank and a sub-assignee of the
mortgage . Orginally, the bank approved to the assignee a line of credit for the purpose of
purchasing mortgages from Urman . The assignee never availed himself of the approval
but acquired mortgages from Urman with funds borrowed from another bank (the
sub-assignee) to which the mortgages had been then assigned . In the fourth case,
subsequent to the assignment of the specific mortgage, Urman specifically assigned to
the bank moneys owing under that mortgage .
' Each trust claimant's rights were spelled out in a detailed trust agreement which
constitutes Schedule A ofthe originaljudgment . In fact Urman syndicated the mortgage
among the various "trust claimants" . The court found that "[h]e did not receive the
money in trust to be advanced on behalf of the trust claimants but received the money
after he had advanced his own money . . . ' : Urinan, supra, footnote 1, at p . 273 .
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debts owing under the real estate mortgages. 6 However, "the bank
impliedly waived its charge in each case where Urmansold or trans-
ferred amortgage or the debt created thereunderto others" .' On their
part, having declined to register financing statements, "these other
persons failed to perfect their [respective] security interest[s] and
therefore became subordinate to the trustee" . 8 The ultimate winners
were therefore Urman's unsecured creditors.9
Theremainder of this commentwill examinethe issues presented
by Urman in the following manner. Part I will discuss the relationship
between a debt and collateral and the implications ofthis relationship
with respect to priorities among competing security interests in the
debt and the collateral . Part II will examine whether the analysis of
Part I fits into the scheme of the PPSA in cases where the obligation
which constitutes the collateral is securedby personal property so that
both the security interest in the obligation and the interest securing it
are governed by that statute. Part III deals with the direct issues dealt
with in Urman . It will first examine the applicability ofthe framework
so far established to situations where the obligation which constitutes
the collateral is secured by a real estate mortgage . Next, it will deal
with the treatment of the bank's waiver in Urman and the ultimate
victory of the unsecured creditors. Part IV will set forth my conclu-
sions which support the substance of Mr . Justice Steel's decision and
examine possible legislative solutions to some of the issues raised by
Urman. It will also examine critically Bill 163, recently enacted in
Ontario partly in response to Urman .9a
In Thornborough v. Baker, 10 Lord Nottingham stated that "in
natural justice and equity the principal right ofthe mortgagee is to the
money, and his right to the land is only as a security for the money" . 11
Therefore, on the mortgagee's death in this case, the debt was consi-
dered to constitute part of his personal estate and became payable to
his executor . It did not pass together with the mortgagee's lands to his
6 Registration of a financing statement perfects a security interest in intangibles
under PPSA, s. 25(1)(c) . Forthe nature ofthe mortgaged debts as "intangible", see text
and footnotes 60-61 infra.
' Urman, supra, footnote 1, at p. 269 .
8 Ibid ., at p. 279,
9 Under PPSA, s.22(1)(a)(iii), ". . an unperfected security interest is subordi-
nate to . . . the interest of a person . . . who represents the creditors of the debtor
as . . . trustee in bankruptcy . . ." .
9' Bill 163, 1st Sess . 32nd Legisl ., 30 Eliz . II, 1981, received Royal Assent on
December 11th, 1981 .
10 (1675), 3 Swan 628, 36 E.R . 1000 .
11 Ibid ., at p. 630.
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heir . The heir held the estate in the mortgaged land on trust for the
executor until the discharge of the debt.' 2
The result is that in equity the mortgage follows the debt . He who
holds the debt is entitled to the benefit of the mortgage . This emerges
from Morley v . Morley . 13 In this case, the mortgagees assigned the
debt secured by the mortgage but reserved the security to themselves .
It was held that the assignment transferred the right to sue on the
mortgagor's covenant for payment, but that the mortgagees remained
"the persons . . . to foreclose" . ' ¢ Nonetheless, money to be obtained
by the mortgagees' foreclosure was to be held by them in trust for the
assignees . As "the only persons who could enforce the deed", the
mortgagees "would be trustees of the money recovered for the [as-
signees] . . . and liable to account to them" . is This means that the
benefit of the mortgage passes to the assignee as an incident of the
assignment of the debt secured by the mortgage .
According to Falconbridge, "a complete transfer of the mort-
gage includes an assignment ofthe debt and a conveyance of the land,
but either may be assigned or conveyed separately" . 16 This however
should be read subject to the preceding analysis . A separate assign-
ment and conveyance could create a split between the entitlement to
sue on the debt and the entitlement to enforce the mortgage . Nonethe-
less, as explained, enforcement of the mortgage is to be carried for the
benefit of the one holding the debt . No split can be created between
the right to the debt and the benefit of the mortgage . He who owns the
debt ultimately enjoys the benefit of the security . 17
This relationship between the debt and security is reflected in
Canadian Bank of Commerce v . Yorkshire & Canadian TrustLtd, is a
1938 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada . The case was con
cerned with the assignment of money due under a contract for the
sale of land . The question dealt with was whether an assignment of a
debt for the unpaid price necessarily carries with it the interest in the
land reserved by the vendor "as a means ofcompelling payment ofthe
'Z See in general : C.H .M . Waldock, The Law of Mortgages (1950), p . 327 .
13 (1858), 25 Beav, 253, 53 E.R . 633 .
``' Ibid., at p . 259 .
"s Ibid- at p. 258 .
16 Falconbridge on Mortgages (4th ed ., 1977, by Rayner and McLaren), p . 249 .
" In the language of an American text book, "the security is inseparable from the
obligation, and . . . whoever can establish his claim to the obligation gets with it the
security interest . . ." . G.E . Osborne, G .S . Nelson and D.A . Whitman, Real Estate
Finance Law (1979), p . 315 and n . 43, relying on the classic statement of the U.S .
SupremeCourt in Carpenter v, Longan (1872), 83 U .S . (16Wall .) 271, 21 L . Ed . 313,
according to which "the debt is the principal and the mortgage an accessory" .
'$ [1939] 1 D .L.R . 401 (S.C.C .) .
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debt secured upon it" . The court gave an affirmative answer: the
security and the right to payment "could not in point of law be
separated" . The former passed to the assignee as an incident of the
assignment of the latter . t s
Jones v . Gibbons20 may appear to be inconsistent with this
analysis . The case was a contest with respect to a debt between a
transferee of the mortgage securing it and a subsequent assignee of the
debt . The court held in favour of the former: "he, who has the estate,
has in effect the debt . . . [B]y the assignment of the mortgage the
debt necessarily passes, as incident to it.-2 1 Nonetheless, this prop-
osition should not be taken to reverse the relationship between a debt
and the mortgage securing it . The case was concerned with the
construction of the document conveying the mortgage . It held in
effect that a transfer of the mortgage without an assignment ofthe debt
secured by it is a futile act and that therefore the document had to be
read as conveying not only the mortgage but also the debt . The
transferee of the mortgage won not because he was a transferee of the
mortgage, but because the document he relied on was construed to
convey to him the debt as well . He won because his right to the debt
was prior in time to that of the subsequent assignee . On final account
the decision supports the view that the mortgage follows the debt:
without his priority with respect to the debt, the transferee of the
mortgage could not retain the benefit of the security .
Secured transactions with obligations are governed in Ontario by
the PPSA. 22 Under this statute, a writing or group of writings which
evidences both a monetary obligation and a security interest in
specific goods is "chattel paper" . 23 Other obligations constitute
"intangible" .24 Monetary obligations incurred in favour of a trader
and in the ordinary course of his business, are "book debts" .25 Where
'9 Ibid., at pp . 405-406, per Davis J . See also at pp . 406-407 per Kerwin J ; and at
pp . 408-409 per Hudson J . The result was that "in accepting the assignment of the
moneys due . . . the bank . . . lentmoney . . . upon the security oflands", in violation
of the then in force s .75(2)(c) of the Bank Act, 1934 (Can .) . Ibid., at pp . 406-407 per
Kerwin J .
2° (1804), 9 Ves . 407, 32 E.R. 659 .
2 ',Ibid ., at p . 411 . See also Neveren v . Wright (1917), 36 D.L.R . 734, at pp .
740-741 (Ont . S.C . App . Div.), and Falconbridge, op . cit ., footnote 16, at p . 253 andn .
33 .
22 The PPSA applies to all secured transactions with personal property : ss 2(a),
1(y), and 1(m) .
zs Ibid ., s .I(c) .
24Ibi&, S . 1(m)
25 Provided "in the ordinary course of [the trader's] business [they] would be
entered in his books" . The term is not defined in the PPSA . Its definition comes from
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they are evidenced by a writing or group of writings which evidences
also a security interest in specific goods, book debts are part of
"chattel paper" . Otherwise they are "intangible[s]" . The PPSA
applies not only to the assignment of book debts intended as security,
but also to their outright sale .26
The characterization of "chattel paper" as a category of
"collateral" ,2' covering a monetary obligation as well as the security
interest in the goods securing it, requires some explanation . In fact, it
is only the obligation which constitutes the collateral . The security
interest in the goods is incidental to the right to enforce the obligation,
and as such, benefits the party with a security interest in the "chattel
paper".28 This can be demonstrated by considering the position of an
assignee with a perfected security interest in goods as compared to
that of a party with a perfected security interest in the obligation
secured by these goods .
An assignee of an unperfected security interest may register "a
financing statement . . . in which [he] is shown as the secured
party" .29 An assignee of a perfected security interest may file a
financing change statement .3° Registration under section 48(2) is for
the purpose of perfecting a security interest in the goods . 31 Registra-
tion under section 48(1) has nothing to do with perfection : an assignee
of a security interest succeeds to the assignor's position "so far as
. . . perfection is concerned" .32 The effect of registration under
section 48(1) is to make the assignee "the secured party of record" . 33
Inquiries concerning the transaction, authorized under section 20,
Shipley v. klarshall (1863), 32L.J .C .P . 258, 259, 143 E.R . 567, cited in approval in Re
PaddleRiverConstruction Ltd(] 961), 35W.WR 605, at p . 614, (Alta S.C .) . See also
Official Receiver v . Tailby (1886) 56 L .J .Q.B . 30, at p . 33 (C.A .), and Re Alna
Manufacturers Ltd (1963) 4 C.B .R . (N . S .) 167, at p . 168 (Ont . S .C .) .
2e PPSA, s.2(b) .
27 "Collateral" is "property that is subject to a security interest" : PPSA, s . i(d) .
Zs Indeed, even without a direct provision, the PPSA must be read to provide that
the security interest in the goods passes to the assignee by an outright assignment of
bookdebts secured by these goods. Thedoubts ofthe B .C . Law Reform Commission on
this point are not justified . See its report on Debtor-Creditor Relationships (Project No.
2) Part V-Personal Property Security (1975), p . 26 .
29 S . 48(2) . An assignee may also take advantage of s . 47(2) and where the
collateral is goods to be held for sale or lease he may register a financing statement
before a security agreement is signed : West Bay Sales Ltd v . Hitachi Sales Corp . of
Canada Ltd (1979), 28 C.B.R . (N .S .) 244 (Ont . S .C . in Bkcy), and Ziegel, (1979), 3
Can . Bus . L .J . 222, at p . 233 . Stated otherwise, a financing statement may be registered
by the assignee before the attachment of the assignor's security interest .
3° PPSA, s . 48(1) .
31 PPSA, s . 47(1) .
32 PPSA, s . 23(2) .
33 PPSA, s . 48(3) .
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would be addressed to him . He will be entitled to file subsequent
financing change statements in connection with the security
interest . 34
The assignee's security interest in the goods is, however, not a
security interest in the secured obligation . Perfection of the former
does not secure perfection of the latter . Perfection of the security
interest in the secured obligation is obtained by perfecting a security
interest in the chattel paper containing the obligation . All this is
demonstrated by the example given in comment 7 to article 9-302 of
the Uniform Commercial Code;
Buyer buys goods from Seller who retains a security interest in them which he
perfects . Seller assigns the perfected security interest to X . The Security interest,
in X's hands and without further steps on his part, continues perfected against
Buyer's transferees and creditors . If, however, the assignment from Seller to X
was itself intended for security [or was an assignment of book debts not intended
as security], X must take whatever steps maybe required for perfection in order to
be protected against Seller's transferees and creditors .
This example presupposes that the assignment of Seller's secur-
ity interest in the goods carries with it the right to enforce Buyer's
obligation, 35 so as to give X a security interest in the chattel paper . 36
If X does not take additional steps to perfect his security interest in the
chattel paper, he ends up with a perfected security interest in the
goods and an unperfected security interest in the chattel paper . On
Buyer's default, he will be protected against Buyer's judgment
creditors levying on the goods . At the same time, on Seller's default,
his unperfected security interest in the chattel paper will be subordi-
nate to the interest of Seller's judgment creditors levying on the
chattel paper without knowledge of X's unperfected security
interest .37
Indeed, a perfected security interest in the goods does not protect
its assignee against Seller's transferees and creditors . Protection
against them depends on priority with respect to the chattel paper .
This is illustrated by adding the following facts to the previous
example .
Suppose Seller, after his assignment to X, assigns the chattel
paper to Y who perfects a security interest in it .39 On Seller's default,
X's interest in the chattel paper is subordinate to Y's security
~' Cf. Comment to ss 9-405 of the American Uniform Commercial Code, herein-
after cited UCC .
3s In the manner considered in the last paragraph of Part 1, supra .
36 Which is the collateral in the UCC example . See PPSA, s . 1(c) .
37 PPSA, s . 22(1)(a)(ii) .
38 Cf. facts of G.B.C .C . v . Bankers Commercial Corp . (1968), 429 S.W. (2d) 60
(Ark . S . C .) .
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interest .39 On Buyer's default and as between X and Y, who has
priority with respect to the goods? X claims to hold a perfected
security interest in the goods on the basis of registration either by the
assignor4o or by himself .41 Y has not registered any financing state-
ment with respect to his interest in the goods . On Buyer's default, will
X come ahead ofY on the basis ofthe perfected security interest in the
goods?
Neither the UCC nor the PPSA contains provisions directly
dealing with this issue . General principles suggest a negative answer .
On Buyer's default the perfected security interest in the goods will not
put X ahead of Y . Regardless of registration, a security interest in the
goods can benefit only the one entitled to enforce the secured
obligation .42 Where both Seller's assignments, to X and Y, were
intended as security, Y who on Seller's default comes ahead ofX with
respect to the chattel paper, may enforce his security interest in the
chattel paper and proceed to collect payments from Buyer . Then, on
Buyer's default, having already enforced his security interest in the
chattel paper, Y may enforce the security interest in the goods .
Where both Seller's assignments to X and Y were outright
assignments of books debts, Seller's default is not a condition prece-
dent to an assignee's rights to proceed against Buyer . Nonetheless, as
between X and Y, the right to obtain payment from Buyer is vested in
Y, who under the PPSA comes ahead of X with respect to the chattel
paper .43 The result is that on Buyer's default, as between X and him,
Y is the one entitled to enforce the security interest in the goods, as
well as to benefit from its perfected status as against Buyer's creditors
and transferees . 44
39 Perfection by Y could be accomplished either by taking possession (s . 24(a) ) or
by registration (s . 25(a) ) . X neithertook possession nor registered a financing statement
with respect to his interest in the chattel paper .
40 PPSA . s . 23(2) .
41 PPSA, s . 48(2) .
42 See: Part 1, supra .
43 The alternative is that as between two outright assignees the priority with respect
to the assigned debt is to be determined by non-PPSA rules, namely by the rule ofDearle
v . Hall (1828), 3 Russ . 1, 38 E.R . 475 (priority according to the order of notices to the
account debtor) . This does not sound plausible . While normally . the benefit of the PPSA
priority scheme is given to a secured party only where his debtor is in default, the
application of the PPSA to the outright assignment ofbook debts (s . 2(b) ) must mean
that the outright assignee may benefit from the PPSA priority scheme in the absence of
the assignor's default .
44 But see V . Countryman, A.L . Kaufman and Z.B . Wiseman, Commercial Law
(2nd ed ., 1982), pp . 148-9.1 understand their argument to suggest that X and Ycompete
over the goods as two creditors of Buyer . X's perfected security interest in the goods
thus puts him ahead of Y with respect to them . I disagree . Neither X nor Y is Buyer's
creditor in his own right . Both are transferees from Seller . He who prevails with respect
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All this is consistent with the theme of Part 1, namely that the
security follows the debt . Entitlement to the benefit of the security
interest in the goods is determined according to the priority with
respect to the right to enforce the secured obligation . Indeed, "the
debt is the principal and the [security] an accessory" . 45
Twill now examine the directissues dealt within Urman.45a I will
first examine the applicability of the framework so far established to
situations where the obligation which constitutes the collateral is
secured by a real estate mortgage. In this context I will consider the
experience under the UCC as well as the interaction between real
estate law and the PPSA priority scheme . Finally I will deal with the
treatment of the bank's waiver in Urman and the ultimate victory of
Urman's unsecured creditors .
UCC 9-102(3) provides that" [t]he application of . . . Article [9]
to a security interest in a secured obligation is not affected by the fact
that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to which
this Article does not apply" . The subsection is illustrated in comment
4 as follows :
The owner of Blackacre borrows $10,000 from his neighbor, and secures his
note by a mortgage on Blackacre. This Article is not applicable to the creation of
thereal estate mortgage . Nor is it applicable to a sale of thenoteby the mortgagee,
even though the mortgage continues to secure the note . However, when the
mortgagee pledges the note to secure his own obligation to X, this Article applies
to the security interest thus created, which is a security interest in an instrument
even though the instrument is secured by a real estate mortgage . This Article
leaves to other law the question ofthe effect on rights under the mortgage [,] of
delivery ornon-delivery ofthemortgage [,] or ofrecording ornon-recording ofan
assignment of the mortgagee's interest . . . .
Originally, comment 4 stated that article 9 applied "to the secur-
ity interest . . . in the note and the mortgage" .46 This language was
.modified, and the comment presently states that article 9 applies to the
security interest in the instrument, "even though the instrument is
secured by a real estate mortgage" (see the second sentence from the
to the right to receive Buyer's payment must prevail with respect to the goods securing
it . I also disagree with theirsuggestion that an assignee's failure to control the record is
detrimental, to his priority with respect to the goods. See discussion on ss 48 and 23(2),
supra.
45 Cf. footnote 17, supra.
45a Except where otherwise indicated, these issues are discussed under the law
which was in force when Urman was decided, namely under the PPSA as itwas prior to
the enactment of Bill 163, supra, footnote 9a. The modifications introduced by Bill 163
are dealt with at the end of Part IV .
46 For the "legislative history" of Comment 4, see Shaw, Security Interests in
Notes and Mortgages: Determining theApplicable Law(1979), 79 Col. L. Rev. 1414, at
p. 1425 . The 1959 original text of Comment 4 is reproduced there in full at p. 1416 .
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end of the quotation) . The modification was a response to a fear raised
among real estate mortgage financers that the original language meant
that the mortgage or the mortgage-note package was a "general
intangible" .47 A security interest in general intangibles is perfected
by registration . A security interest in instruments is perfected by
possession .48 The practice among United States real estate mort-
gagees is to take mortgagors' promissory notes in connection with
mortgage indebtedness . The revision of the comment was thus de-
signed to reaffirm the efficacy of perfecting security interests in such
promissory notes by taking possession rather than by registration .
Nonetheless, two American cases seized on the modification in
the language of comment 4 and held that article 9 does not apply to
security interests in real estate mortgages . Where a promissory note
and mortgage together become the subject of a security interest, only
that portion of the package unrelated to the real property "is now
covered by Section 9-102" .49 One case, In re Bristol Associates,
Inc . 50 was concerned with the applicability of article 9 to a security
interest in a real estate lease . The other, Rucker v. State Exchange
Bank51 dealt with the position of the mortgage assignee vis-à-vis the
mortgagor and his transferees and creditors . None of them was faced
with competing priorities with respect to a real estate mortgage, or
with the assignee's position vis-A-vis the mortgagee's transferees and
creditors . Nor did these courts have anything to say on the split
priorities with respect to the note and the mortgage resulting from
their decisions . Their authority is strongly undermined bytheir failure
to consider the relationship between the right to enforce the note and
the right to enforce the mortgage, namely the relationship between the
debt and the mortgage securing it . 52
Indeed, faced with competing priorities with respect to mort-
gages and notes, or with the assignee's position vis-à-vis the mort-
gagee's creditors, one American court went the other way . Thus, in In
" See in general, Coogan, Kripke and Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9:
Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge
Clauses, and Participation Agreements (1966), 79 Harv . L . Rev . 229, at pp . 270-271 .
`'$ UCC §§9-302 and 9-305, corresponding toPPSA ss25 and 24 . All UCC cites are
from the 1972 official text .
49 I n re Bristol Associates, Inc . (1974), 505 F . (2d) 1056, at p . 1061 (U.S . C.A .,
3rd Cir .), cited with approval in Rucker v . State Exchange Bank (1978), 355 So . (2d)
171, at p . 174 (Fla Dist . C.A .) .
so Ibid.
52 The cases are criticized by Shaw, op . cit ., footnote 46, at p . 1422 . See also
Bowman, `Real Estate Interests as Security Underthe UCC: The Scope ofArticle Nine'
(1980), 12 U.C.C.L.J . 99, at p . 132 (in conjunction with pp . 120-121) .
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re StaffMortgage andInvestment Corporation, 53 the court was con-
cerned with priorities with respect to real estate mortgages and notes
secured by them . The contest was between an assignee of the mort-
gagee claiming a security interest in the mortgages and the notes and
the mortgagee's trustee in bankruptcy . The court concluded that the
collateral was an "instrument", and held forthe trustee in bankruptcy
since the secured party, not being in possession of the notes, had
failed to perfect his security interest .54 Registration of the assign-
ments ofthe mortga es in local realproperty records was ofno avail to
the secured party.5
The Ontario PPSA does not have a provision modelled on UCC
9-102(3) . 56 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the provision as con-
strued in StaffMortgage57 is good law in the province . This construc
tion is consistent with general principles governing the relationship
between debt and mortgage . As will be demonstrated below, it pro-
duces a coherent approach to the determination of priorities .
I will nowexaminethe reasoning given in Urman to the applica-
tion of the PPSA to the competing rights with respect to Urman's
mortgages . Relying on Falconbridge,s$ Steel J. stated that.
It has long been settled that areal estate mortgage security is personal property as
well as usually being a conveyance of the title to the land . The mortgage transac-
tion normally includes both an acknowledgementofdebt and a conveyance ofthe
land as security and either may be assigned or conveyed separately .
He then considered legislative history, and concluded that "the
P.P .S .A. shouldbe read to embrace all personal property in its widest
sense" .6° "Intangible" under section 1(m) is "all personal property,
including those in action" which does not fall within a specific class
of collateral (namely goods, chattel paper, documentsof title, instru-
s3 (l977), 550 F. (2d) 1228 (U.S . C.A . 9th Cir.) .
54 UnderUCC 9-301(1)(b), as well as underPPSA, s.22(1)(a)(iii), anunperfected
security interest is subordinate to the interest of the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy.
55 OtherAmerican cases which are in line with the principal holding ofIn re Staff
Mortgage are cited by Shaw, op . cit., footnote 46, at p. 1421 .
56 At the same time there is no parallel in the PPSA to UCC9-1040): "This Article
does not apply . . . to thecreationor transfer ofan interest in . . . real estate . . . " .The
provision was held to be subject to s. 9-102(3) (quoted at the beginning of Part III,
supra) : Groves v. United States (1978), 202 Ct. CL 660, at p. 675. See Shaw, op . cit.,
footnote 46, at p. 1421 :
57 See,supra, footnote 53 .
5s Falconbridge, Law of Mortgages of Land (3rd . ed ., 1942), pp . 219 and 249 .
59 Urman, supra, footnote 1, at p. 265.
60 Ibid, at 267 . In this direction see also C.T.L . Uniforms Ltd v. ACIMIndustries
Ltd (1981), 33 O.R . (2d) 139 (H.C .) where Krever 7. held (at pp . 146-147) that a
leasehold in land is "intangible" under the PPSA . Real estate leases are explicitly
excluded fromthe coverage ofArticle 9: UCC9-1040) . They were later excluded from
the scope of,the PPSA by Bill 163 .
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ments or securities) . Accordingly, Urman's mortgages fell within the
ambit of "intangible" .61
Insofar as Mr. Justice Steele appears to suggest the possibility of
splitting between the debt and the benefit of the mortgage62 his
analysis should be rejected .63 Nonetheless, his ultimate conclusion
was that the mortgage followed the debt, and thatpriority with respect
to the debt conferred on the prevailing party also the benefit or the
mortgage . This indeed is in line with Staff Mortgage .64 It is further
consistent with the theme of this comment .
I will now discuss the question of competing priorities with
respect to mortgages and the debts secured by them . I will deal with
the interaction between real estate law and the PPSA priority scheme
first in general, and second as applied to Urman .
It is submitted that the principles determining priorities among
competing interests in connection with obligations secured by person-
al property, discussed in Part 11 of this comment, suggest a framework
governing the determination of priorities with respect to obligations
secured by real property . Such a framework was in fact applied in
StaffMortgage 65 as well as in Urman . Thereunder, the position ofthe
mortgagee's assignee as against the mortgagor's creditors and trans-
ferees is determined according to the mortgagee's priority with re-
spect to the land . The mortgagee's priority, as well as the mortgagee's
remedies are governed by real estate law . But whether a particular
assignee succeeds to the mortgagee's position is another matter, not
governed by real estate law. To the extent that a particular assignment
is governed by the PPSA, namely where it is an assignment intended
as security or an outright sale of book debts,66 whether the assignee
claiming under it succeeds to the mortgagee's position, or in other
words, the question of the assignee's position as against the mort-
gagee's creditors and transferees, depends on a timely perfection of
the security interest in the secured debt . It is therefore determined
under the PPSA.
61 Normally, promissory notes are not used in Canada in connection with mortgage
indebtedness . Consistently with this practice, such instruments were not used in connec-
tion with Urman's mortgages . For the contrary U.S . practice, see text which follows
footnote 48, supra . The difference between the U.S . and the Canadian practice was
noted by Britton, Assignment of Mortgages Securing Negotiable Notes (1916), 10 Ill .
L . Rev. 337, at p . 338 and n . 8 .
62 See footnote 59 and text, supra.
63 See Part I, supra .
64 See text and footnotes 53-55, supra .
bs INd.
16 See in general, first paragraph of Part II, supra .
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I will now consider the application of this analysis to land
governed by the Land Titles Act ." Under section 93(3) of this act,
the registration of a real estate mortgage "confers upon the chargee a
charge upon the interest of the chargor . . . free from any unreg-
istered interests in the land" . A registered charge is "a security upon
the land . . . to the extent of the money . . . actually advanced . . ."
and certain future advances .68 Its priority ranks ahead of all interests
subsequently registered . 69 This priority is, however,only as against
the mortgagor's transferees and creditors . Where the mortgagee bor-
rows money and as for his indebtedness assigns the mortgage, the
assignee's position as against the mortgagee's transferees and
creditors is governed by the PPSA . This stems from the applicability
of the PPSA to the security interest in the secured debt and the
relationship between that debt and the mortgage securing it . It is
further supported by section 69 of the PPSA which provides that in a
case of a conflict between the PPSA "and a provision of any general
or special Act, other than the Consumer Protection Act" the PPSA
prevails . As was in fact suggested by Steele J . in Urman, 70 section
100(3) of the Land Titles Act which provides for the effect ofregistra-
tion of a transfer of a charge in the land titles office7' is thus super-
seded by the PPSA .
Registration of an assignment under the Land Titles Act is none-
theless not meaningless . For example, certain powers, including the
power to enforce a charge, are in the hands of one whose interest is
registered under the Land Titles Act.72 Unless superseded by the
PPSA, this could cause a split between the entitlement to foreclose,
determined under the Land Titles Act, and the entitlement to the
benefit of the foreclosure, determined under the PPSA according to
the entitlement to the debt . Such a split has always existed where a
mortgage purported to convey the land separately from the assign-
ment of the debt . 73
67 R.S.O ., 1980 c . 230 .
68 Ibid ., s . 93(4) .
69 Ibid ., s . 81(5) .
7o Urman, supra, footnote 1, at pp . 267-268 . Steele J . did not mention specifically
s . 100(3) of the Land Titles Act, ibid .
7' Under s . 100(3), ibid . : "The transfer [of a charge], when registered confers
upon the transferee the ownership of the charge free from any unregistered interests
therein, and the transfer of part of the sum secured by a charge confers upon the
transferee the ownership of such part free from any unregistered interests therein ."
72 See e.g ., ss 96 (entry by ownerofcharge), 97 (foreclosure by ownerofcharge),
98 (remedy of owner of charge with power of sale) and 99 (dealings with registered
charge), ibid .
73 See footnotes 13-17 and text, supra .
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This analysis is explained by the following example. Owner of
Whiteacre, to which the Land Titles Act applies, borrowed money
from Lender . As security for his obligation, Owner mortgaged White
acre . The charge was properly registered under the Land Titles Act .
Lender borrowed money from Assignee and assigned to him the
mortgage as security for his indebtedness . Assignee registered a
financing statement under the PPSA . Subsequently, Owner mort-
gaged Whiteacre to Financer as security for another loan and Lender
assigned the first mortgage and Owner's debt secured by it, to Broker .
Financer and Broker respectively registered only under the Land
Titles Act. Both Owner and Lender defaulted . Lender comes ahead of
Financer with respect to Whiteacre .74 Assignee prevails over Broker
not only as to Owner's debt secured by Whiteacre, but also as to
Whiteacre itself.' While Broker, the registered transferee of the
charge on Whiteacre might hold the power to enforce the mortgage,
this power ought to be exercised solely for Assignee's benefit .76
Obviously, foreclosure or the enforcement of the mortgage in White-
acre is governed by real estate law .
The report of Urman does not state explicitly whether the general
assignment from Urman to the bank was intended as security or
whether it was an outright sale of Urman's accounts . Nonetheless,
Steele J . spoke of "the bank loan" . 77 Likewise he stated78 that the
general assignment in Urman was "similar" to the one dealt with in
In Re Marton Lumber Company Ltd . 79 In that case the general
assignment was intended as security$° so we can safely assume that
this was the case in Urman . But even if this is an erroneous assump-
tion, Urman's general assignment to the bank was an outright sale of
book debts." Either way, the assignment, governed by the PPSA,
conferred upon the assignee-bank priority as against competing un-
perfected or subsequently registered security interests governed by
74S . 81(5) of the Land Titles Act, supra, footnote 67 .
' For a contrary view see Shaw, op . cit ., footnote 46, at p . 1429 and n . 85-87 :
"[where] both the mortgagee and mortgagor default, the failure of the mortgagee's
[assignee] to record . . . [the] assignment . . . could well impair his ability to foreclose
on the real property or to withstand a challenge by the mortgagor's trustee in bank-
ruptcy" . I disagree . See text and notes 62-75 .
76 See text and note 61, supra .
" Unnan, supra, footnote 1, at p . 269 . See also at p . 268 .
78 Ibid., at p . 270 .
79 (1924), 4 C.B.R . 477 (Ont . S .C . in Bkcy) .
$° Ibid., at 478 .
$' See footnote 84, infra . Nonetheless, Steele J . erred in holding (Unnan, supra,
footnote I , at p . 268) that In Re MartonLumber Company Ltd, supra, footnote 79, is an
authority to the application ofthe old book debts legislation to a similar situation . That
case dealtwith the assignment of debts and choses in action underthe federal Bank Act .
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the PPSA, as well as against subsequent buyers. Apparently, all of
Urman's competing assignments, as well as the interest given by him
to the "trust claimants" were intended as security . 83 Since the debts
assigned to the competing claimants arose in Urman's course of
business as a mortgage broker, they seem to constitute "book
debts", 84 and thus even if any assignment was an outright sale, it gave
rise to a "security interest' 85 and was governed by the PPSA . 86 In the
priority contest between the bank and the competing claimants, the
former, having a perfected security interest in the secured debts,
appeared to win as against the latter who held unperfected security
interests in the same collateral . Registration of their respective in-
terests in a registry or land titles office by some competing claimants
was of no avail . None of the contests was concerned with rights to the
land as against the mortgagor. Rather they were all priority contests
among transferees and creditors of the mortgagee, with respect to the
secured debts for which the mortgages were accessories .
Nonetheless, at the end of the day the bank was unable to take
advantage of its priority and for a good reason . As Steele J . con-
cluded, "the entire purpose ofthe bank loan . . . was to permit Urman
to carry on his business in the normal course" . 87 The mortgages in
Urman's hands were his "stock-in-trade" 88 and "the bank never
intended, nor did Urman intend, that the general assignment would
hamper Urman from dealing with the mortgages and debts thereunder
in the normal course of his business" . 89 The bank rather gave Urman
"the implied authority" to . sell and deal with the mortgages ."° Ac-
cordingly, "once [a] mortgage was dealt with or assigned by
[Urman], it was freed from the [bank's] specific charge" .9t There-
82 See ingeneral ss 9, 22(1)(b) and 35(1) . Cf. Bowman, op . cit., footnote 42, at pp .
134-135. Forthe limits of this priority, see text and footnotes 81-94, infra.
8s See in general footnotes 4-5 and text, supra. Note however that Steele-J .
regarded the "trustagreements" as "trust receipts" falling unders. 2(a)(i) ofthePPSA:
Urman, supra, footnote 1, at p. 274 . However, "trust receipts" denotes a mechanism
for inventory financing, used in the U .S . more than in Canada, which has nothing to do
with the fact situation in Urman. In general for the U.S . trust receipt, see e.g. : G.
Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (1965), Vol. 1, ch . 4.
84 For the definition of "book debts" see footnote 25 and text, supra. For the
comprehensiveness of the term and its applicability to debts created by the sale of
intangibles in the ordinary course of trade of a seller of such intangibles, see e.g .,
Shipley v . Marshall, supra, footnote 25, at p. 569 (B.R .) .
85 PPSA, s . 1(y) .
86 PPSA, s . 2(b) .
87 Urman, supra, footnote 1, at p. 269.
88 1bid, at p. 270.
89 Ibid., at p. 269.
9° Ibid ., at p . 271, see also at jp . 275 .
9' Ibid., at p. 271 .
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fore, notwithstanding the perfection of its security interest, the bank
did not come ahead of the competing claimants .
In fact Steele J . found in favour of the competing claimants by
treating them as purchasers in the ordinary course of their vendor's
business . In Ontario, rights of an ordinary course buyer are protected
under section 2(1) of the Factors Act,92 as well as under section 30(1)
of the PPSA. Both provisions are limited to buyers of goods; they do
not protect a purchaser of debts secured by real estate mortgages .
Nonetheless, this aspect of the analysis of Steele J ., dealing with the
protection of the competing claimants as against the bank, is entirely
correct and sound. The PPSA explicitly provides that dealing with the
collateral by the debtor in a manner "expressly or impliedly autho-
rized" by the secured party puts an end to the latter's security
interest." The extinction of the perfected security interest in favour
of any ordinary course buyer is in fact a specific situation falling also
within the general rule of section 27(1) (a) . A purchaser of a secured
debt in an authorized dealing" is definitely protected under the latter,
The competing claimants' victory over the bank turned out to be a
phyrric victory . To the extent that Urman's assignments and "trust"
obligations created security interests in his secured debts,95 perfec
tion by registration was required to protect these interests from Ur-
man's trustee in bankruptcy . 96 Having failed to register financing
statements, the competing claimants lost the benefit of their security
interests . Their failure was of no avail to the bank : "Once the bank
waived its rights they cannot be revived . . . merely because other
persons have not taken proper action to protect themselves . "97 The
ultimate winners were Urman's unsecured creditors .98
On its facts Urman was correctly decided . None of the secured
parties acted properly to protect their respective positions . The bank
had the advantage of having a PPSA financing statement in connec
tion with Urman's mortgages . Nonetheless, it failed to anticipate the
" R.S .O ., 1980, c . 150 .
93 S . 27(1)(a) . Regrettably, "apparent" authority is not mentioned . Cf. UCC
9-306(2) : "A security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding . . . disposition
. . . unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement
or otherwise. . ." (emphasis added) .
94 In any event note that an authorized dealing under s . 27(1) differs from the
transfer "with consent" under s . 49(l) . The former contemplates the waiver of the
security interest by the secured party, typically in inventory or stock in trade . The latter
contemplates the retention of the security interest by the secured party .
9s See in general text and footnotes 77-82, supra .
96 PPSA, ss 25(1)(c) and 22(l)(a)(iii) .
97 Urn:an, supra, footnote 1, at p . 279 .
98 See footnotes 8-9 and text, supra .
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issue raised by the authority given to Urman to deal with the mort-
gages . The bank was supposed to look only to the proceeds arising
from the assignments of Urman's mortgages .99 Probably it failed to
perfect a security interest with respect to them as required by section
27(2) . loo The competing claimants appeared to be entirely unaware of
the applicability ofthe PPSA to their dealings . They thus failed to take
steps designed to perfect their respective security interests under the
PPSA. Accordingly, the mortgages and the debts secured thereby fell
into the hands of Urman's trustee in bankruptcy.
IV
Urman held that the PPSA applies to the assignment ofreal estate
mortgages, and that priorities with respect to such mortgages are
determined according to the PPSA. The decision did not please the
real estate bar . Nonetheless, as explained in this comment, the case
was correctly decided as a matter of general principles of law as well
as of statutory, interpretation .
Whether the decision reflects a desirable state oflaw is obviously
an entirely different question . From this viewpoint, the real issue is
not the applicability of the PPSA as a matter of general principles and
statutory provisions, but rather the desirability ofapplying the "float-
ing lien" concept into real estate mortgage financing . The question is
whether we are interested, on policy grounds, in the creation of a
security interest in a mortgage portfolio, in the same way that an
effective security interest in changing inventory of goods can
presently be created . Stated otherwise, the question is whether we
want a mechanism which will enable a mortgage dealer to be financed
like a car dealer, as well as enabling a small mortgage lender to obtain
funds from a larger lending institution on the security of his mortgage
portfolio . '01 .
If such a financing tool is desired, then the PPSA serves as a
useful vehicle to accomplish it . In this respect, to enhance its effec-
tiveness, it requires only relatively minor or cosmetic changes . Thus
for example, the Act should be amended so as to avoid the split
between the right to foreclose and the entitlement to the benefit of a
99 PPSA, s. 27(1)(b) .
ioo Urman, supra, footnote 1, at p . 271 .
1°' Cf. the practice of "mortgage warehousing", widely spread in theU. S . Under
this practice : "[T]hrift institutions, including savings and loan associations, saving
banks, and credit unions, pledge mortgages and notes oftheirhomeowner borrowers to a
commercial bank or mortgage banker as security for their own borrowings . The bank
takes delivery of the paper and "warehouses" it until the institutionhas accumulated a
block of mortgages large enough to sell ." Shaw, op . cit., footnote 46, at p. 1415 .
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mortgage . This may be achieved by explicitly providing in the PPSA
that where the collateral is a secured debt, the entitlement to the
benefit of a charge securing it is followed by an entitlement to exercise
all remedies and privileges in connection with this charge.' 02 Another
amendment could require that where a general assignment purports to
cover debts secured by real estate mortgages, this fact must be noted
in the financing statement . 1 " The PPSA should also be amended to
apply explicitly the section 30(l) ordinary course buyer exception to a
buyer of intangibles from one who deals with them in the ordinary
course of his business . 104
Such amendments would undoubtedly improve the operation of
the PPSA in relation to security interests in mortgage portfolios . It is
nonetheless obvious, that even without them, the PPSA accommo
dates the "floating lien" concept much better than the Registry
Act' 05 or the Land Titles Act, 106 where the concept does not fit in at
all .
The position of an assignee of a specific real estate mortgage will
now be considered . Should he be required to register a PPSA fi-
nancing statement? Such registration does not enhance the effective
ness of a security interest in a mortgage portfolio . One thing is to say
that unless an assignee of a specific real estate mortgage qualifies as
an ordinary course purchaser or that the disposition to him is autho-
rized, his interest is subordinate to a security interest in the assignor's
mortgage portfolio, with respect to which a PPSA financing statement
was previously registered . Another thing is to say that unless an
assignee of a specific real estate mortgage registers a PPSA financing
statement his interest will be defeated by the assignor's trustee in
bankruptcy notwithstanding the assignee's compliance with registra-
tion requirements under real estate law . Policy grounds which may
justify the former, do not extend to the latter . No useful purpose
appears to be served by double registration by an assignee of a specific
real estate mortgage . Yet such double registration was required from
the competing claimants in Urrnan . A PPSA financing statement was
required for protection from Urman's trustee in bankruptcy . Real
estate registration was still useful for the purpose of rights under real
`0z For the split between the benefit of the mortgage and certain powers and
privileges with respect to them, see footnote 72 and text, supra .
'03 Cf PPSA, s . 10(b) requiring land identification in fixture financing and Reg-
ulation 3 under the PPSA, O . Reg . 879/75 as amended by O . Reg . 547/7 9 requiring to
set out in a financing statement the classification of the collateral and its description in a
case of a motor vehicle classified as consumer goods .
Los Cf. text and footnotes 92-94, supra .
Los R.S .O ., 1980, c . 445 .
ioe Supra, footnote 67 .
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estate law .'07 Saying that Urman was correctly decided on this point
does not mean that it reflects desirable policies .
Needless to say, merely excluding the interest of an assignee of a
specific real estate mortgage from the coverage of the PPSA will not
serve as a comprehensive solution . An amending statute must provide
for the priorities between a security interest in a mortgage portfolio
and the interest of an assignee of a specific real estate mortgage . A
sound legislative solution should be consistent with the PPSApriority
scheme as well as with the policy of avoiding superfluous registra-
tions . Such a solution should provide thatfor the purpose ofthe PPSA
priority scheme the effect of registering a specific mortgage assign-
ment in a proper land registry office is the same as the registration of a
PPSA financing statement with respectto the debt secured by it . Such
a provision will not undermine the effectiveness of a security interest
in a mortgage portfolio. Registration of a PPSA financing .statement
in connection with this portfolio will put the secured party ahead of
the interest acquired by a subsequently recorded unauthorized real
estate mortgage assignment . At the same time, registration of the
assignment under the proper real estate statute will put the assignee
ahead of a subsequently registered PPSA security interest'" as well
as the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy .
All this presupposes the desirability of a "floating lien" in
connection with real estate mortgages . But if such a mechanism is
considered to be undesirable, the best legislative solution is to ex
clude explicitly all assignments of debts secured,by real estate mort-
gages from the coverage of the PPSA. An assignment of a mortgage
will be construed to include an assignment ofthe debtsecured by it,'o9
Priority as to the debt will be determined according to the priority as to
the mortgage .
Unfortunately, Bill 163, "AnAct to amend the Personal Proper-
ty Security Act", recently enacted'10 inter alia in response to Urman,
neither improves the "floating lien" mechanism, nor excludes
altogether real estate mortgage financing from the coverage of the
PPSA. It rather introduces confusion and uncertainty into what
appears to me a clear, though not always defensible, state of law.
107 See text and footnotes 72-73, supra.
Los Obviously, where a promissory note is given for a mortgage obligation, no
registration of the mortgage assignment whether under the PPSA or in a land registry
office, can secure priority to the assignee . See PPSA, s. 31(l)(a), preserving rights ofa
holder in duecourse . Assignee's priority againstaholderindue course_ofthenote can be
provided only by an amending statute. For the use of promissory notes in real estate
mortgages financing see footnote 61, supra.
'09 Cf. last paragraph of introduction, supra.
"0 See footnote 9a, supra.
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Bill 163 contains three provisions applying to security interests
in debts secured by real estate mortgages :
1 . An amended section 3(1) of the PPSA provides inter alia that the
assignment of a real estate mortgage is excluded from the cover-
age of the PPSA. Nonetheless, the PPSA applies to "an assign
ment of a right to payment under a mortgage . . . where the
assignment does not convey or transfer the assignor's interest in
the real property" (new section 3(l)(e)(ii) ) .
2 . As new section 54(1)(b) provides for the registration of a
notice in the properregistry office where "the security interest is
. . . in right to payment under a mortgage . . . of real property to
which [the PPSA] applies" .
3 . Under a new section 36a(2) :
A security interest in a right to payment under a mortgage . . . of real property, to
which [the PPSA] applies, is subordinate to the interest of a person who acquires
the mortgagee's . . . interest in the mortgage . . . if the interest of the person is
registered in the proper land registry office before a notice of the security interest
is registered in the proper land registry office .
The form of the notice under section 54(l)(b) will be prescribed
by regulations . To the extent that such notice will have to identify the
land concerned, Bill 163 rejects the "floating lien" concept in con
nection with real estate mortgages . At the same time, as explained
below, the PPSA is not rendered altogether irrelevant in determining
priorities in connection with real estate mortgage financing .
Read alone, new section 3(1)(e)(ii) seems to raise the pos-
sibility of a split priority between a debt and the right to a real estate
mortgage securing it."t I Yet, read in conjunction with new section
36a(2), new section 3(l)(e)(ii) makes more sense . The combined
effect of the two provisions is that the registration of a specific
assignment in the proper land registry office will put the assignee
ahead of a secured party who subsequently registered his PPSA
security interest in the land registry office under new section 54(1)(b) .
The assignee's priority will be with respect to the land as well as to the
debt .
What is the position of a security interest in a right to payment
under a real estate mortgage to which the PPSA will apply under Bill
163, vis-à-vis the interest of an assignee of a specific real estate
mortgage, where the latter registered the mortgage assignment after a
notice of the security interest had been registered in the proper land
registry office? The negative implication from new section 36a(2) is
that priority is given to the security interest in the right to payment
"' Cf. text and footnotes 49-52, supra .
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governed by the PPSA. But does this priority extend to the real estate
mortgage securing the right to payment? A positive answer is sugg-
ested if one recalls that the mortgage follows the debt . Nonetheless, is
not this rule explicitly rejected by proposed section 3(1)(e)(ii)? Does
this mean a split priority? Does this mean that real estate law det-
ermines priority? I do not know. . .
Had Bill 163 been law in Urman, priority would have been given
to the competing claimants . Registration of their interests in the
proper land registry office, would have protected them against the
trustee in bankruptcy . As I indicated, I find this result quite desirable .
Nonetheless, Bill 163 does not represent the best way to achieve it .
BENJAMIN GEVA*
FAMILY LAW-SUPPORT FOR ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN-STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION-RETROACTIVE OPERATION OF LAW ABOLISHING
ILLEGITIMACY-RETROACTIVE OPERATION OF NEW CHILD SUPPORT
LAW .-A wise judge has been quoted early in this century as saying,
"There are no illegitimate children ; only illegitimate parents", and
Ontario's laws have finally caught up with this perceptive reflection
with the passage of The Children's Law Reform Act, 1977.' Under
this enactment, all children, whether born in or.out of wedlock are to
be treated equally for all purposes in the eyes of the law of the
province.' Regrettably, the recent decision of the Ontario High Court
in Re Bagaric and Juric3 has suggested that all children are not yet
equal, and that the repealed legal regime that distinguished between
legitimate and illegitimate children may still survive to haunt those
who were unfortunate enough to be born out ofwedlock . The case has
disturbing implications .
In 1973, nine months after the birth of Elizabeth Bagaric, her
unmarried mother brought an application under Ontario's now re-
pealed affiliation legislation4 for an order declaring the putative father
to be in fact the father of the child and requiring him to pay support .
That application was dismissed, no order for maintenance was made,
* Benjamin Geva, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
' S.O ., 1977, c. 40 ; now consolidated as R.S.O ., 1980, c. 68 .
Z 'bid ., 1 and 2 .
3 (1980), 29 O.R . (2d) 491, 114 D .L.R . (3d) 509 (Ont . H.C .) .
" S . 51 of The Child Welfare Act, R.S .O ., 1970, c. 64 ; repealed by subs . 73(2) of
The Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S .O ., 1978, c. 2 now consolidated as R.S.O .,
1980, c. 152.
